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Broadband network development does not always track closely a nations overall wealth and economic
strength. The International Telecommunication Union reported that in 2005 the ﬁve top nations for
broadband network market penetration were: Korea, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Denmark and Canada.
The ITU ranked the United States sixteenth in broadband penetration.
Aside from the obvious geographical and demographic advantages accruing to small nations with large
urban populations, broadband development thrives when it becomes a national priority. Both developed
and developing nations have stimulated capital expenditures for infrastructure in ways United States public
and private sector stakeholders have yet to embrace. Such investments have accrued ample dividends
including the lowest broadband access costs in the world. For example, the ITU reports that in 2002
Japanese consumers paid $0.09 per 100 kilobits per second of broadband access compared to $3.53 in the
United States.
Economic policies do not completely explain why some nations offer faster, better cheaper and more
convenient broadband services while other nations do not. This paper will examine best practices in
broadband network development with an eye toward determining the optimal mix of legislative, regulatory
and investment initiatives. The paper will track development in Canada, Japan and Korea as these nations
have achieved success despite signiﬁcantly different geographical, political and marketplace conditions. The
paper also notes the institutional and regulatory policies that have hampered broadband development in
the United States.
The paper also will examine why incumbent local exchange and cable television operators recently have
begun aggressively to pursue broadband market opportunities. The paper will analyze incumbents’
rationales for limited capital investment in broadband with an eye toward determining the credibility ofsee front matter r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Few would dispute that information and communications technologies (ICTs) can effectively
‘‘prime the pump’’ of a nation’s economy (OECD, 2002).1 Efﬁcient information age
infrastructures enhance productivity (Grace, Kenney, & Zhen–Wei Qiang, 2004) by providing
intelligent networks that can handle converging (Hukill, Ono, & Vallath, 2000) voice, data and
electronic commerce applications. These infrastructures provide a comparative advantage in
‘‘knowledge-based’’ (OECD, 1995, p. 3)2 industries that include such diverse ﬁelds such as data
processing, banking, insurance, management and technical consulting, travel planning, customer
relations management, business logistics, etc. With an increasingly global economy enhanced by
reduced trade barriers and the quest by companies to ﬁnd new growth opportunities, substantial
incentives exist for public and private players to leverage comparatively greater competency in
information and communication markets domestically and abroad (Zhen-Wei Qiang, Pitt, &
Ayers, 2003).3
Curiously, the track record for ICT implementation achieved by individual companies and
nations does not always correlate with other indicators of success in trade, development and
quality of life. For example, the United States has excelled in a number of information industries,
including public sector leadership in developing Internet and private sector success in electronic
commerce and other ICT markets such as computers, software and integrated circuits (Leiner
et al., n.d.). But surprisingly observers across the political and social spectrum have roundly
criticized the state of broadband network development (Grant & Latour, 2003)4 in the United1‘‘The capacity of countries and ﬁrms to develop and manage knowledge assets has become a major determinant of
economic growth and competitiveness.y [I]nvestment in and exploitation of knowledge remains a key driver of
innovation, economic performance and social well being. Over the last decade, investments in knowledge—as measured
by expenditures on research and development (R&D), higher education, and information and communication
technologies (ICTs)—grew more rapidly than gross ﬁxed capital formation.’’ OECD (2002).
2‘‘Knowledge is now recognized as the driver of productivity and economic growth, leading to a new focus on the role
of information, technology and learning in economic performance. The term ‘knowledge-based economy’ stems from
this fuller recognition of the place of knowledge and technology in moderny economies.’’
3See also, World Summit on the Information Society and the Role of ICT in Achieving the Millennium Development
Goals, web site, available at: http://topics.developmentgateway.org/ict/sdm/previewDocument.doactiveDocumentId=
815843; ICT for Development Web site, available at: http://topics.developmentgateway.org/ict; International Telecommu-
nication Union, The World Summit on the Information Society Web site, available at: http://www.itu.int/wsis/.
4ICT development covers many diverse segments of a national economy. Accordingly, broadband development, by
itself, may not serve as a complete measure of national success or failure in ICT development. On the other hand, one
cannot overemphasize the importance of broadband network access for a variety of ICT services, including high speed
Internet access and an increasing percentage of Internet-delivered services, such as Voice over the Internet Protocol,
telephone services. ‘‘Currently VOIP [Voice Over Internet Protocol] accounts for less than 3% of global voice phone
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in the United States contrasts with far greater success achieved by other nations, including ones
with no prior success in ICT development and with fewer ﬁnancial resources than the United
States (Hopkins, 2004).
The International Telecommunication Union reported that as of 1 January 2005 the ﬁve top
nations for broadband network penetration were: Korea, Hong Kong, the Netherlands,
Denmark, and Canada (ITU, 2005). The ITU ranked the United States 16th in broadband
penetration. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development reported that in mid-
2003 the top market penetration for member nations occurred in: Korea, Canada, Iceland,
Denmark and Belgium with the United States ranked tenth (OECD, 2003a).
One might infer that comparatively poor new telecommunications infrastructure development
(FCC, 2004)6 in the United States and in other developed economies would adversely affect
overall ICT development and global marketplace success. Indeed some stakeholders seeking more
aggressive governmental support and regulatory relief in the United States claim that the nation
collectively has forgone billions in lost business revenues and productivity gains (Pociask, n.d.).7
These assertions make sense in light of the view that national and private investments in ICT have
a multiplier effect by accruing dividends far greater than simple recoupment of costs (New
Zealand Trade and Enterprise, n.d.; The Digital Opportunity Initiative, 2001).8(footnote continued)
calls, according to an AT&T estimate. But a number of trends are working in its favor, say industry executives: the
boom in demand; the evolution of the technology which permits companies to offer services beyond the reach of
conventional phones; and the spread of broadband connections, which make VOIP much easier to use.’’
5‘‘The pace of deployment and technological progress in broadband, or high-speed, services remains seriously
inadequate, a problem that results from the monopolistic structure, entrenched management, and political power of
incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) such as BellSouth and Verizon and the cable television industry. It is
worsened by major deﬁciencies in the policy and regulatory systems covering these industries. Failure to improve
broadband performance could reduce U.S. productivity growth by 1 percent per year or more, as well as weaken public
safety, military preparedness, and energy security’’ (Ferguson, 2002). ‘‘[Bill] Gates said US broadband would lag behind
European and Far Eastern countries by ‘ﬁve to six years’. He slammed US telecom providers and cable networks for
recently increasing prices’’ (Morgan, 2002).
6Current broadband infrastructure enhancements primarily involve upgrading existing telephone and cable television
networks. Digital Subscriber Link service from local exchange carriers involves an upgrade to local loop copper wires so
that they offer more bandwidth capable of providing both legacy voice telephone service and Internet access. Cable
modem service from cable television companies involves the partitioning of an existing broadband wire into separate
video delivery and Internet access links. Unlike most nations, cable modem access has predominated in the United
States. Cable modems provide 75.3 percent of all broadband services in the United States while DSL serves 14.9% as of
December 2003.
7‘‘Waiting for computer screens to ﬁll has resulted in $25 billion a year in lost e-commerce and countless billions of
dollars in lost time for consumers.’’
8‘‘ICT is an integral component of every sector in the New Zealand economy—working behind the scenes as an
‘enabler’—and is also a major sector in its own right.y The information and communications technology sector:
 makes a signiﬁcant contribution to export growth
 can have a multiplier effect across other sectors
 can transform business and operational processes
 lifts productivity
 improves health and education outcomes
 has the potential to add exceptional value to New Zealand’s traditional industries.’’
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with large urban populations, broadband telecommunications network development has become
a national priority for many nations. Governments in many developed and developing nations
have organized a cohesive and comprehensive strategy for stimulating capital investment in ICT
infrastructure and for expediting the deployment of ICT services in ways United States public and
private sector stakeholders have yet to embrace. Such efforts have accrued ample dividends
including the lowest broadband access costs in the world. For example, the ITU reports that in
2002 Japanese consumers paid $0.09 per 100 kilobits/s of broadband access compared to $3.53 in
the United States (ITU, 2003a). This wide disparity exists in part, because Japanese broadband
service providers have made the investment necessary to accommodate robust demand and to
achieve economies of scale.
This paper will identify what institutional conditions in legislative, regulatory and business
forums achieve success in developing faster, better cheaper and more convenient broadband
services. The paper will concentrate on what strategies have worked well in Canada, Japan and
Korea and what institutional constraints have handicapped broadband development in the
United States. The paper uses broadband development as a proxy for considering how institutions
can achieve greater efﬁciency and effectiveness in ICT development despite vastly different
geographical, political and marketplace conditions.2. Why ICT incubation matters
Both developed and developing nations recognize that ICT provides an effective opportunity to
improve national living standards through enhancement of productivity (Hanna, 1994; Zhen-Wei
Qiang et al., 2003).9 Few would dispute that telecommunications and information processing
technologies serve as powerful agents for economic and social development by improving access
to information, enhancing trade in commodities and services, reducing costs and achieving
efﬁciency gains:
ICT can help enhance the working of markets and reduce transaction and coordination costs
within and across organizations. This is of particular relevance to developing countries where
transaction costs are very high because of logistical problems. ICT applications can enable
improvements in productivity and quality in a number of sectors y such as agriculture,
manufacturing, infrastructure, public administration, and services such as ﬁnance, trade,
distribution, marketing, education and health (Sein & Harindranath, 2004).(footnote continued)
(New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, n.d.). ‘‘Well-targeted ICT interventions in ﬁve key interrelated areas can play a
crucial role in igniting and sustaining this development dynamic by creating the necessary conditions to achieve critical
mass and to reach the thresholds required for signiﬁcant multiplier effects and increasing returns to scale’’ (The Digital
Opportunity Initiative, 2001).
9‘‘Information technology dramatically increases the amount and timeliness of information available to economic
agents—and the productivity of processes to organize, process, communicate, store, and retrieve information y
[thereby impacting] countries, as producers and users of this technology’’ (Hanna, 1994, p. 1).
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increasingly integrated global economy can quickly erode a nation’s comparative advantages,
particularly ones prone to volatility resulting from technological innovation. For example, ICT
provides developing nations with greater opportunities to accelerate their ascent of a technology
development learning curve through technology transfer and foreign direct investment. While ICT
ﬁrst might generate threats to employment in developed nations through outsourcing, it might
subsequently jeopardize wealth generation in knowledge industries as emerging nations establish
their own research and development prowess. When developing nations wean themselves of
dependency on developed nations’ patents and innovations, the upside revenue generating
opportunities become more contestable among all nations.
For example, China has quickly evolved from providing cheap labor for component assembly,
e.g., cellular radiotelephones, to a nation that can challenge its developed counterparts on the
intellectual property and standards developed for next generation equipment. In the span of a few
years Chinese companies have increased the amount of value they contribute to a product and in
turn the ﬁnancial returns accruing for such effort. Chinese mobile telephone manufacturers
initially assembled handsets for sale domestically. Soon these companies provided world class
quality assurance, in addition to cheap labor, so that their assembled handsets rivaled anything
offered in the global marketplace. Not content with low margin assembly work, some
manufacturers have collaborated with the Chinese government, technology parks and universities
to develop the intellectual property needed for next generation mobile telephones. In short order,
Chinese companies have migrated from ICT original equipment manufacturers for other
companies, to ICT royalty paying ventures marketing their own equipment, to ICT innovators
possibly soon to seek royalty payments from other manufacturers (Yan, n.d.).10
ICT development presents both challenges and opportunities to all nations. Developing nations
no longer face the inevitability of having to organize their economies solely for the beneﬁt of
developed countries that provide the market demand for cheaply produced products. Developed
nations can no longer consider technology transfer as largely a one-sided transaction that expands
market penetration without risk of lost markets in the future.3. The role of government in ICT incubation
Regardless of political and economic philosophy, national governments have signiﬁcant
functions to play in ICT development. Successful strategies have included an expansive
governmental role in several areas including:1
SC
staDeveloping a vision and strategy.
 Promoting digital literacy, i.e., the ability to use digital technologies to pursue information,
communications and entertainment interests. Investing in infrastructure, aggregating demand and serving as an anchor tenant.
0In a joint venture with Siemens the China Academy of Telecommunications Technology has developed the TD-
DMA mobile radio standard for third generation mobile radiotelephones. This is the ﬁrst telecommunications
ndard proposed by the Chinese industry and accepted as one of several standards by international forums.
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 Creating incentives for private investment and disincentives for litigation and other delay
tactics. Offering electronic government services, including healthcare, education, access to information,
and licensing. Promoting universal service through subsidies and grants.
 Revising and reforming governmental safeguards to promote a high level of trust, security,
privacy and consumer protection in ICT services, including electronic commerce.
Nations with successful ICT development strategies do not appear to quibble about whether
government should meddle in areas that the private sector possibly could manage exclusively.
However, one person’s view of government stewardship might come across to another as
‘‘industrial policy’’ and centralized management by the public sector. Successful ICT incubation
appears to require government involvement, albeit with a light hand that stimulates and rewards
investment, reduces unneeded regulatory scrutiny, and promotes global marketplace attractive-
ness without ‘‘tilting the competitive playing ﬁeld’’ to favor a speciﬁc technology or company.4. ICT incubation in the United States
Curiously even as the United States severely lags in broadband market penetration, this nation
has achieved global supremacy in other ICT markets in part through the successful partnership of
the public and private sector. The ‘United States’ model for ICT development favors
entrepreneurialism and private enterprise coupled with direct and indirect ﬁnancial support by
government primarily through early stage incubation. For example, the Internet originated as a
collaboration of government agencies and universities under the auspices of the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency, a branch of the United States Defense Department. The
Internet later evolved under loose management and ﬁnancial support from the National Science
Foundation with the Department of Commerce administering domain name registration. While
the United States government later eliminated direct ﬁnancial underwriting when it privatized the
Internet backbone, few would argue that early underwriting and anchor tenancy exempliﬁed
effective and successful government incubation of ICT.
In the United States, governmental underwriting of Internet development had a short time
span, because of an institutional predisposition against government management of commercial
markets and the perception by entrepreneurs that high monetary rewards justiﬁed risk taking. In
stark contrast to the absence of broadband incubation, the United States government got
involved early, but calibrated a timely exit strategy when a critical mass of private resources had
developed. The United States government could make a quick exit, because venture capital could
readily replace taxpayer ﬁnanced investment, research and development. Additionally a well
developed marketplace for lawyers, accountants, consultants, and entrepreneurs made it possible
for private risk taking. A favorable tax climate ensures that ample rewards provide incentives for
entrepreneurship.
High technology hotbeds, such as Silicon Valley, California demonstrate a largely private
orientation to ICT development in the United States. In an assessment of what makes Silicon
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(Lee, Miller, Hancock, & Rowen, 2000) suggest ten factors:(1) Favorable rules of the game—laws, regulations, and conventions for securities, research and
development, taxes, accounting, corporate governance, bankruptcy, immigration and
development designed to support entrepreneurship and risk taking.(2) Knowledge intensity—the region has achieved a critical mass of ideas for new products,
services, markets and business models. Silicon Valley serves as a magnet for entrepreneurs,
educators, venture capitalists and people with vision.(3) A high quality and mobile work force—talented, educated and motivated people seek to
make a home and a fortune in the region.(4) Results-oriented meritocracy—talent and ability accrue rewards in Silicon Valley without
regard to race, ethnicity and age.(5) A climate that rewards risk-taking and tolerates failure—the region supports a high risk/high
reward calculus, but also makes it possible for entrepreneurs who have experienced failure to
regroup and try again.(6) Open business environment—the region supports robust competition, but also knowledge
sharing. This win/win environment results from the frequent formal and informal
interactions among people with similar interests and objectives. Networking and relation-
ships matter as much as technological innovations.(7) Universities and research institutes that interact with industry—major universities like
Stanford foster exchanges among academics and entrepreneurs.(8) Collaborations among business, government and nonproﬁt organizations—the region houses
universities, trade associations, labor councils, service organizations and companies all of
which collaborate and network with an eye toward a successful future.(9) High quality of life—despite trafﬁc congestions, soaring housing prices, relentless pace of
work and recent power outages, Silicon Valley offers proximity to open spaces and urban
amenities.(10) Specialized business infrastructure—the region provides access to specialists needed for
economic development including consultants, lawyers, venture capitalists and executive
recruiters.ICT incubation in the United States has achieved great success, in part, thanks to largely
underemphasized governmental involvement. However, one should not discount the effect of
early government ﬁnancial involvement coupled with ongoing ﬁnancial beneﬁts accrued through
favorable tax treatment and other ﬁnancial incentives, e.g., tax holidays, revenue repatriation,
infrastructure improvements and favorable immigration policies.5. ICT development failures in the United States
The fact that the United States lags signiﬁcantly in broadband infrastructure development
provides a stark contrast to the success story outlined above. Several legislative and regulatory
initiatives have failed to achieve the intended results, or have backﬁred. While the United States
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California, the nation substantially lags in the increasingly essential ﬁrst and last kilometer access
to ICT provided by broadband telecommunications networks. This failure juxtaposes with this
nation’s leadership in commercialization of the Internet and broader electronic commerce
markets.
The failure of the United States to develop best in class broadband infrastructure results, in
part, from lack of investment in new ICT technology by incumbent telecommunications service
providers. Additionally, most market entrants concentrated on serving long haul transmission
markets while opting to rely on incumbents to provide ﬁrst and last kilometer access at
promotional prices as required by law. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Frieden, 1997)
provided a legislative qui pro quo for incumbent Bell Operating Companies: authority to provide
long distance toll telephone services in exchange for providing local exchange access based not on
historical technology deployment costs, but on forward looking, best practices new technology
costs (Frieden, 2003a, b). While the incumbent Bell Companies welcomed the opportunity to
generate new long distance telephone service proﬁts, they objected as ‘‘conﬁscatory’’ the duty to
enhance competitors’ market share by offering local exchange network access at rates well below
what they considered cost and what they would demand in commercial negotiations (Baumol &
Merrill, 1997; Spulber & Yoo, 2003).
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not stimulate the development of viable local
exchange service competition and the upgrading of local networks to provide broadband, high-
speed data services (Dibadj, 2003). The Bell Operating Companies refused to make the necessary
investments based on the view that they should not have to continue subsidizing competition,
particularly in light of the fact that many new competitors did not appear inclined ever to migrate
from reselling Bell network capacity to building and operating their own local facilities.
Additionally, both incumbents and newcomers suffered heavy ﬁnancial losses as a result of
severe reversals in the markets for anything relating to the Internet. The bursting of the dotcom
bubble shifted investor sentiment from irrational exuberance to extraordinary pessimism.
Investment bankers quickly moved from supporting acquisition of market share to requiring
evidence of near term proﬁtability, thereby making capital investment contingent on largely
unachievable results.
Additionally, the proliferation of operating standards, particularly in wireless services, has
fragmented telecommunications equipment markets and has made it difﬁcult for any one
company or technology to reach a critical mass. Consensus on operating standards can occur as a
result of government stewardship, market forces or stakeholder collaboration. In the United
States none of the three options has occurred, resulting in slower rollout of some ICT technologies
and adoption by consumers.
The combination of market downturn, legislative failure and lack of consensus on operating
standards has removed many of the incentives for risk taking and investment, even as the need for
network upgrades proved essential for the evolution of high-speed broadband ICT services.
Stakeholders appeared more intent on competing in the courtroom than in the marketplace. The
incumbent Bell Operating Companies made infrastructure investment contingent on securing
massive regulatory liberalization which, if implemented, might result in the establishment of
a shared monopoly among telephone and cable television companies without signiﬁcant
government oversight.
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overall economy improves and as the Bell Operating Companies succeed in securing regulatory
relief, including forbearance from having to comply with requirements speciﬁed in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. However, the potential for much faster and earlier rollout of
new ICT technologies existed in the United States without government legislators and regulators,
having to dismantle still essential regulatory safeguards.6. Best practices in ICT development
Nations as diverse as Canada, Japan and Korea provide insights on how to achieve maximum
success in ICT development and what roles governments can effectively assume. These and other
nations offer insights on how government-led integration of technology incubation and
development can generate ample dividends. While these governments readily encourage private
enterprise and direct foreign investment in technology ventures, they do not shy from pursuing an
active and vital role. In vivid contrast to the United States model where government incubates and
quickly departs, best practice ICT development in many nations demonstrates the beneﬁts from
long-term involvement by honest, technologically sophisticated government ofﬁcials that
understand the stakes involved and work conscientiously to establish a transparent, efﬁcient,
ﬂexible and positive business environment for the long run.
For example, in many nations governments sponsor science and technology parks where the
government or a government appointed manager integrates all of the necessary elements for ‘‘the
production and commercialization of advanced technologies by forging synergies among research
centers, educational institutions and technology-based companies’’ (Petree, Petkov, & Spiro, 1999).
Governments can achieve this synergy primarily through investments, preferential policies and focused
leadership under the auspices of an economic development board that underwrites programs designed
to ﬁnance research and development projects and to promote commercialization of applied research.
Put another way, nations have expedited ICT development by mastering the ability to foster an
efﬁcient and favorable business environment. This environment results, in part, from the ability of
technology parks and other development vehicles to foster: cooperation in both pure and applied research and development with scientiﬁc research
institutes and laboratories; ease of access to venture capital;
 the availability of professional, technical, administrative and legal assistance;
 state-of-the-art information and telecommunications services; and
 a fair and transparent business infrastructure.
7. Indigenous comparative advantages
Before considering what public and private actions can do to expedite ICT development, one
should appreciate that a signiﬁcant set of indigenous factors that contribute to, or deter progress.
A number of localized characteristics favor ICT development independent of concerted actions.
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function of nation size, population density, per capita income, percentage of high rise housing and
size of households.
Nations and administrative regions such as Korea, Singapore (Aizu, 2002; Wong, 2003)11 and
Hong Kong (ITU, 2003b) should have an easier ICT development task simply because
telecommunications carriers have fewer lines to install and more people possibly served by these
lines. Geographically small nations, with little rugged terrain and high incomes can achieve ubiquitous
digital network access on a timely and efﬁcient basis, perhaps even without having to create a sizeable
fund for subsidizing service to rural and low-income residents. Similarly, with a population skewed to
youthful, urban apartment dwellers, telecommunications carriers can more readily introduce new
services and achieve comparatively higher penetration rates than what carriers in other nations would
achieve. A nation such as Korea enjoys a larger percentage of technology ‘‘early adopters’’ keen on
accessing services that provide faster, better, smarter, cheaper and more convenient solutions to
existing requirements coupled with a willingness to use technologies to serve new wants, needs and
desires. Well educated Korean youth with sufﬁcient discretionary funds supported ICT development
ﬁrst by frequenting personal computer gaming rooms, known as PC bangs, and later by embracing
new markets including streaming music, Internet and wireless messaging and online photography.
Additionally, one cannot underestimate the impact of attitudes toward ICT and the extent to
which entrepreneurs will take risks to provide services offering clearly better consumer beneﬁts. A
culture favoring education, speedy resolution of problems and risk taking favors ICT
development, because consumers will more readily embrace technologies that provide tangible
improvements. The push of new technologies meets an equally aggressive demand pull.8. Acquired comparative advantages
Indigenous comparative advantages cannot reliably propel a nation into ICT development
supremacy, nor do the identiﬁed factors help explain why some nations excel while others falter.
Acquired comparative advantages result from concerted efforts by the public and private sector to
achieve ICT development with an eye toward fostering improvements in the quality of life,
individual wealth and national economic development (OECD, 2003b). The best advantages
result when governments effectively calibrate the scope of intervention to the degree of market
stimulation required and the extent to which ICT development would not occur but for
government subsidization, demand aggregation, and sponsored pilot projects.9. Government vision, strategy and stewardship
The acquisition of comparative advantages in ICT development appears impossible without
some degree of government involvement. No matter how attractive ‘‘blue sky’’ technologies
appear on the horizon, governments may need to jump start new technology adoption and
thereby accelerate the accrual of a critical mass needed to achieve scale economies and the ability
to offer services at rates a mass market will support. Before private enterprises can operate largely11Izumi Aizu compared successful deployment in Korea versus mixed results in Singapore.
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the case for Internet development in the United States. Governments willing to undertake an
active role need to reach closure on a vision of what constitutes ICT development success and
what steps they should take to achieve these outcomes.10. Canadian government efforts
The Canadian government also launched a series of early ICT development initiatives articulated in
the 1990s (Industry Canada, 1994; Government of Canada, 1996; Connecting Canadians Web site).
The Ministry of Industry articulated a strategy to make Canada the most connected country in the
world12 and to achieve ICT development primarily through the promotion of on-line access,
developing ICT-intensive ‘‘smart communities,’’ creating incentives for the creation of indigenous
content for transmission via the Internet, expediting electronic commerce and delivering electronic
government services (ITU, 2003c). In 2001 a National Broadband Taskforce speciﬁed a strategy for
achieving ubiquitous access to broadband networks and services by 2005 (Government of Canada,
2004). Speciﬁcally the Task Force established several access priorities including the view that all
communities, including small businesses and residential users, should have Internet access at
throughput speeds in excess of 1.5megabits/s, rural access rates should not exceed urban rates, and the
local broadband infrastructure should extend to schools, public libraries and other public access points.
The Task Force identiﬁed two funding vehicles for achieving these goals:(1)12A top-down infrastructure government support model that creates broadband network and
service investment incentives.(2) A bottom-up ‘‘community aggregator model’’ where government funded pilot programs and
the delivery of electronic government services help stimulate the generation of sufﬁcient
demand to use existing network capacity and stimulate the construction of new facilities.11. Korean government efforts
The Korean government articulated an action plan in 1997, entitled Cyber Korea 21
(Government of Korea, 1999, 2002) when the Ministry of Information and Communications
articulated a vision of a ‘‘knowledge-based economy’’ where every citizen would have access to a
personal computer, the government would expedite development of an information infrastructure
and all stakeholders in ICT would work together (ITU, 2003d) to increase productivity,
employment and exports (Government of Korea, 2003; Dahlman & Andersson, 2001). The
Korean government recognized that the scale and ambitiousness of such a vision would require
several types of initiatives and ﬁnancial inducements (Lee, n.d.) including: Efforts by regulatory authorities to encourage infrastructure investment by incumbents and
market entrants (OECD, 2004).For background on Canada’s broadband initiatives see http://www.broadband.gc.ca/pub/media/index.html.
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netRegulatory parity among operators with an eye toward promoting facilities-based competition,
but also market entry by operators who might need to access some facilities of the incumbent. Direct underwriting, loans, favorable tax treatment, and other types of ﬁnancial support for
construction of new high capacity backbone digital, broadband networks. Financial support for research, development and technology demonstration projects; subsidies
for purchase of personal computers by low-income citizens. Promoting digital literacy including the ability to use information technologies for interacting
with government and for acquiring information, communications and entertainment services
(Han). Supporting electronic government, education, e-commerce (Lee, O’Keefe, & Yun, 2003),
healthcare and other types of ICT-mediated services.13
12. Japanese government efforts
Japan developed a high level national information ‘‘e-Japan’’ strategy in 2001 with ambitious
goals addressing infrastructure, human resources, e-commerce, e-government and network
security (see Prime Minister Japan and His Cabinet). 14 Perhaps smarting from less robust
development than nearby Korea, Japan expedited the development of the world’s most advanced
telecommunications and information networks, blending private and public sector initiatives
(ITU, 2003e, Ishii, 2003). The e-Japan strategy triggered the development of 220 separate projects
in its ﬁrst year and achieved the goal of linking 30 million households to high speed Internet access
options (Yamada, 2004; Takada, 2003; Taniwaka, 2003, 2004). Today Japanese residential
consumers have the highest throughput speeds and the lowest per megabit cost.13. Regulatory initiatives
Perhaps the key regulatory initiative pursued by nations such as Canada, Korea and Japan lies
in effectively changing the regulatory climate without triggering costly and protracted litigation
such as that which has thwarted progress in the United States. Nations can use regulatory change
to promote facilities-based and resale competition through incremental deregulation of the sector,
liberalization of rules affecting incumbent carriers and mandating cost-based and compulsory
access to the incumbent carrier’s switches and transmission capacity at fair and compensatory3For extensive research and reports on ICT issues in Korea and elsewhere see Korea Informatization Promotion
mmittee Web site at: http://www.ipc.go.kr/intra/HPEnglish.nsf. and Korea Information Strategy Development
titute Web site at: http://www.kisdi.re.kr/.
4See Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet (2001), Information Technology web site, available at: http://
w.kantei.go.jp/foreign/it_e.html; ‘‘We will strive to establish an environment where the private sector, based on
rket forces, can exert its full potential and make Japan the world’s most advanced IT nation within ﬁve years by:
building an ultra high-speed Internet network and providing constant Internet access at the earliest date possible,
establishing rules on electronic commerce, (3) realizing an electronic government and (4) nurturing high-quality
man resources for the new era.’’ e-Japan Strategy, Jan, 2001, available at: http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/it/
work/0122full_e.html.
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in ICT infrastructure.
National regulatory authorities have to ﬁnd a way to create incentives for incumbents
and newcomers alike to invest in infrastructure needed to provide high-speed broadband
data services. The key driver for such investment lies in the development of sus-
tainable competition with a multiplicity of operators in each of the technologies providing
broadband services now or prospectively, viz., wireline telephony operators ﬁrst using em-
bedded copper and later using ﬁber optic facilities, wireless operators and cable television
ventures. As a result of competition in conventional voice telephone services, incumbents
typically face declining margins and the potential for commodity pricing, i.e., limited ability
to differentiate their telephone service from that offered by other carriers. Faced with
such competitive necessity it follows that incumbents would have to diversify services and
pursue new proﬁt centers including value added network, wireless and data services (Frieden,
2003a, b).
The need to respond to declining revenues in core business lines and new deregulatory
opportunities have begun to stimulate interest in expediting delivery of broadband services
by United States carriers. However, years earlier, carriers in Canada, Japan and Korea
made such investments as a result of governmental encouragement, real or perceived com-
petitive necessity and internal market forecasts. Meanwhile in the United States in-
cumbent telephone companies complained about the unfairness in having to unbundle their
networks and offer access to individual elements at rates below market. Cable television ventures
succeeded in thwarting efforts to force them to provide common carrier like open access to any
Internet Service Provider in lieu dedicated access to a corporate ISP afﬁliate or joint venture
partner.
Carriers in best practice nations accepted the regulatory mandate and turned their attention to
capitalizing on new market opportunities. Carriers in the United States resorted to litigation and
delay with an eye toward conserving capital until such time as the demand for broadband services
became unassailable. Such stalling tactics resulted from conditions of heightened fear, uncertainty
and doubt resulting from an economic downturn largely triggered by a decline in conﬁdence that
the Internet and demand for Internet services would trigger perpetual growth. Carriers more
willing to embrace change and to accept the onset of a ‘‘new world order’’ predominated by data
services (Kiser & Collins, 2003; Frieden, 2003b) appear better equipped to capitalize on new
market opportunities. Carriers keen on conserving capital and reducing risk exposure appear less
able to migrate from a business plan predominated by voice services, despite the fact that this once
core market has deteriorated and will continue to decline as consumers migrate to wireless and
Internet-based, data services.14. Supply side stimulation: underwriting research, funding pilot programs and community
champions
Nations offering best practices in supply side stimulation recognize the importance of triggering
an expedited migration from narrowband to broadband services and promoting widespread
availability of new services at attractive prices (United Kingdom Department of Trade and
ARTICLE IN PRESS
R. Frieden / Telecommunications Policy 29 (2005) 595–613608Industry and Brunel University, 2002).15 While preferring private carriers to make the transition
to broadband on the basis of competitive necessity and declining margins in basic voice telephony
markets, government at the local, provincial and federal level volunteered to provide ﬁnancial
support under conditions of market failure, i.e., the unwillingness of private ﬁrms to make the
investment based on the view that they lacked certainty whether they could accrue a sustainable
and adequate proﬁt. Such self-help programs brought broadband digital services to hinterland
locations north of the artic circle in Canada, primarily through assessment of business plans of
community groups also known as ‘‘community champions’’ and the grant of up to 50% of the
eligible costs anticipated to develop a broadband program.
Ironically the use of metered pricing for narrowband services made it ﬁnancially more attractive
to migrate to unmetered, always on (‘‘all you can eat’’) broadband services. Unlike in the United
States, telecommunications consumers in many nations have to pay per minute rates for access to
voice telephone and Internet services. With the onset of broadband services, charged on a ﬂat-
rated monthly basis, even moderate World Wide Web surfers could opt for unlimited access at a
slightly higher rate.15. Demand side stimulation: promoting digital literacy, aggregating demand and delivering e-
government services
Best practice includes efforts by national governments to stimulate and aggregate demand
primarily by offering citizens better ways to acquire government, education and health services.
While youthful video gamers needed no inducement to appreciate the beneﬁts of high speed,
online access, others grew to appreciate the time saving and productivity enhancements available
from broadband services. For example, high-speed data networks make it possible for remote
communities to secure medical consultations with local nurses and doctors based at urban
teaching hospitals, as well as rapid transmission of X-ray images. E-learning possibilities include
high-speed access to data bases, multi-media learning tools, and video conferencing with teachers
in a virtual classroom environment.16. New challenges to developed nations
Developed nations such as Germany and the United States increasingly have to rely on ICT
markets to accrue competitive advantages that generate wealth and support high existing
standards of living. These nations can no longer simply assume that developing nations will serve
as largely untapped markets, or as low cost assemblers and manufacturers of goods using
intellectual property created in developed nations. For developed nations ICT development
generates new risks and insecurity not only in light of employment losses due to outsourcing, but15Stewardship by the Korean government offers several vehicles for expediting broadband deployment and use. See
United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry and Brunel University, Investigating Broadband Deployment in
South Korea—Broadband Mission to South Korea (October 2002); available at: http://www.broadbanduk.org/reports/
SKorea_report.pdf.
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cost assemblers.
Developing nations such as China have already established themselves as least cost
manufacturers using the intellectual property created elsewhere. ICT incubation for some
developing nations provides the opportunity to become more than technology licensees and
copiers. For developed nations to maintain their comparative advantage in ICT, they must
continually prime the pump through research and entrepreneurship. As never before ICT
incubation provides upside opportunities for all nations.17. Conclusions
ICT development, including investment in a robust broadband infrastructure, requires
extensive coordination and cooperation among private and public sector players. Successful
ICT development typically occurs if and only if both types of participants stick to roles proven to
maximize beneﬁts. For government the empirically proven role involves neither a laissez faire
abdication of responsibility, nor intrusive, heavy-handed, command and control regulation that
predominated when private or government monopolies largely controlled the roll out of ICT.
Governments can enhance ICT development by articulating from the top a broad vision of what
ICT can do for a nation and its citizens, while leaving to community champions the ﬂexibility to
propose speciﬁc, ‘‘bottom-up,’’ projects that aggregate the supply of services needed to support
the build out of a telecommunications infrastructure.
For the private sector, the proven role does not involve extensive litigation, and delayed
investment, or the leveraging of ICT investment in exchange for even greater deregulatory relief.
The private sector needs to make the necessary investments in ICT incubation, but government
can create incentives for such investment by underwriting and guaranteeing loans, providing
favorable tax treatment and ﬁnancially supporting a portion of the necessary research,
development and technology demonstration projects.
Governments do not serve as a catalyst simply by throwing money at the ‘‘problem’’ of
insufﬁcient ICT development. Wasted investment in ICT development can occur if government
relies on one category of private sector participant, e.g., incumbent local exchange telephone
companies, to administer the major programs designed to promote universal access to basic
telecommunication services. The incumbent develops a reliance on, and expectation for this
funding source and has little incentive to achieve a universal service goal, as opposed to justifying
an ongoing source of subsidies for preferred beneﬁciaries which includes the carrier itself.
Developing a recurring subsidy and funding mechanism, as opposed to relying primarily on ad
hoc project funding, typically justiﬁes the need for an extensive bureaucracy similarly keen on
pursuing an ongoing mission, or expanding broad development goals. Ironically, the universal
service funding mechanism in the United States, which promotes subsidized access to often
unmetered basic telephony, has created disincentives for consumers to migrate to available, but
unsubsidized broadband services.
Nations achieving comparatively greater success in ICT development demonstrate the value in
having a speciﬁc mission, achievable goals and policies designed to achieve success. The
governments of Canada, Japan and Korea articulated a vision of what ICT could do for both and
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incentives for risk taking and innovation and penalized litigation and strategies to delay making
necessary investment in capital-intensive projects. At the micro-level these nations linked public
funding with private initiatives that aggregated demand, generated matching funds and justiﬁed
the installation of ICT even in geographically unattractive locales.
The United States has largely failed to match its comparative advantage in private ICT
incubation, such as Silicon Valley, with similar world class governmental incubation, despite
having achieved success in developing and then privatizing the Internet. The lack of success in
recent governmental incubation efforts, e.g., in broadband market penetration, stems largely from
the failure to appreciate the need to blend and integrate both private sector entrepreneurialism
and public sector stewardship. Such stewardship involves active governmental involvement, as
cheerleader, referee, loan guarantor, grant funder and anchor tenant in a sector that many in the
United States believe warrants little if any government involvement. Nations exhibiting best
practices in ICT development clearly show the beneﬁt of a combination of public and private
initiatives.References
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